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Since the 1990s ethnic violence within states has become much more common than 
interstate violence and tends to be harder to stop, leading to the question, how 
states can avoid ethnic violence and best accommodate multiple ethnicities within 
their boundaries. The worldwide increase of inner-state civil wars or complex 
emergencies has set peace and conflict studies high on the agenda of development 
and foreign policy debate. A central question in the theoretical debate is the 
consolidation and arrangements of democratic systems and institutions in 
ethnically heterogeneous societies, to prevent and resolve violent conflicts. In this 
recent debate there is still a lack of empirical research, analysing the opportunities 
and obstacles of conflict resolving political structures, processes and institutions in 
more depth. This paper therefore aims to contribute to the recent debate on conflict 
preventive/transforming arrangements of democratic systems by discussing 
proposals on federal restructuring and devolution of the political system in Sri 
Lanka as well as by looking into the realities of recognition of minorities at local 
level. 
 Federalism is a lively discussed issue in Sri Lanka since 1926, when S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike advocated the idea of federalism as a constitutional response to Sri 
Lanka's diversity. Federal and quasi-federal solutions have been central to the 
constitutional debate on the resolution of the conflict in the North-East 
(Tiruchelvam 2000:197) – the potentials of conflict management through a federal 
system are discussed and promoted by different parties, academics and organizations,
                                                 
1 Christine Bigdon is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the South 
Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg and former Representative of the South Asia 
Institute’s branch office in Colombo. 
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which work on constitutional reforms, even more in the recent peace process after 
the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Sri Lankan 
Government and the LTTE. The negotiation process between the Sri Lankan 
government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) has reached a new 
stage with the agreement in Oslo to settle the ethnic conflict through a federalist 
solution. In the light of the history of the ethnic conflict and the debate on its 
possible settlement, this can be seen as a major breakthrough, both from the side of 
the LTTE as well as the Sri Lankan government. The peace talks and the process of 
negotiating a settlement of the 20 year-old ethno-political war in Sri Lanka will 
require ideas for the reformation of the political system of Sri Lanka, which are 
suitable to accommodate the interests and grievances of the two conflict parties as 
well as other identity groups, like the Muslim community. 
 This paper will focus on the overall question whether adopting federalism in 
Sri Lanka is an option to accommodate the claims of different identity groups. 
Besides the theoretical considerations, the central empirical research question is, in 
how far the existing decentralized structures and powers of the local government 
are suitable to accommodate the politics of recognition of specific ethnic (minority) 
groups. Therefore the strength and limitations of the existing scheme of devolution 
of powers will be analyzed, looking into the realities at the local level, with special 
regard to the recognition of minorities. The hypothesis of this paper is that the 
lessons learnt at the local level with regard to good governance and recognition of 
minority groups can provide important answers to the question how to restructure 
the political system that it is suitable to accommodate all identity groups.  
 Analyzing three selected local authority areas of Sri Lanka in the South, up-
country and North-East, this paper aims to assess in how far the local government 
system is recently capable to address the grievances of ethnic minority groups at 
the local level. The line of argumentation of this assessment is based on literature 
analysis as well as qualitative interviews conducted in selected Provinces in four 
Pradeshiya Sabha areas with representatives of the local government as well as 
civil society activists. This paper draws on ongoing empirical research in Sri Lanka 
and presents preliminary results.  
 The paper is divided in four chapters. Chapter II will provide an overview of 
the discussion on federalism as solution to address ethno-political grievances in 
general and with special regard to the Sri Lankan context. In chapter III a historical 
background on the devolution and decentralization process in Sri Lanka and the 
establishment of the local government system will be provided. Chapter IV looks 
into the realities and potentials of the local government system to address the 
grievances and recognize minority groups at local level. The limitations and 
obstacles of the recent situation at the local political level are summarized under V 
with regard to lessons learnt for the revived discourse on federal structures for Sri 
Lanka as solution to the ethnic conflict. 
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F E D E R A L I S M  A N D  C O N F L I C T  M A N A G E M E N T  O F  
E T H N O P O L I T I C A L  G R I E V A N C E S  
 
T h e  N e x u s  B e t w e e n  D e m o c r a c y ,  F e d e r a l i s m  a n d  N o n - V i o l e n t  
C o n f l i c t  M a n a g e m e n t  
 
The starting point for the theoretical framework of this paper is the nexus between 
democratic systems and their potential for civic conflict management of inner-state 
conflicts. Democracy is widely perceived as a suitable system to manage diverse 
social interests and inherent conflicts in a non-violent manner. Compared with 
authoritarian systems, where existing social tensions are often suppressed, 
democratic systems transform conflictive issues in communicative processes, 
which can help to prevent violent conflict escalation. 
 
“Democracy is in many ways a system of managing social conflicts 
that arise from community diversity using a set of agreed social rules. 
In a democracy, disputes arise, are processed, debated and reacted to, 
rather than being resolved definitely. In short, democracy operates as a 
conflict management system without recourse to violence” (Sisk et al. 
2001:72). 
 
To institutionalise these communicative conflict management mechanisms and to 
develop conflict transforming capacities within the political system, specific 
arrangements of democratic structures, procedures and political culture is 
necessary. Considering the fact, that inner-state violence has not decreased in the 
countries of the third wave democracies – violent ethnic conflicts have rather often 
been triggered in the process of democratic and liberal transformation - it becomes 
especially important to look into aspects of consolidating democracies through 
institutionalising suitable institutions, structures and procedures as well as a 
political culture, which support non-violent conflict management.  
 As democracy is often understood and practiced as rule of the numerical 
majority it leaves open and disputed questions regarding the issue of minority 
representation. Numerically weak minorities resent the majoritarian essentialism 
inherent in this understanding of democracy (Uyangoda 2000:9), which often leads 
to ethnic conflict. Horowitz stressed the nexus between democracy and minority 
representation by stating “democracy is about inclusion and exclusion, about 
access to power, about privileges that go with inclusion and the penalties that 
accompany exclusion” (Horowitz 1993:18). The policies and institutions that settle 
ethno-political conflicts and manage diversity peacefully include full political and 
civil rights for ethnic minorities, programs to alleviate their poverty, protection of 
them to use their languages and cultures, regional autonomy and devolution of 
power, and mechanisms or incentives for sharing power, constructing multi-ethnic 
coalitions, encouraging crosscutting alignments, and allowing broad access to 
power at the centre (Diamond 1999:6). In the process of consolidating democracy 
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and establishing a system to manage diversity peacefully, federalism or devolution 
of power has become an important element but cannot be regarded as a solution in 
itself. 
 
F e d e r a l i s m  v e r s u s  U n i t a r y  S t a t e  
 
Democracy does not guarantee sufficient representation for all interest groups, as 
majority rule may permanently shut minorities out of power. In such circumstances 
of politically mobilized ethnic consciousness, a unitary state is liable to leave 
minority ethnic groups feeling powerless, insecure and excluded (Diamond 
1999:151). The lack of influence over decision-making and recognition often leads 
to secessionist movements of mobilized ethnic groups. Federalism2 plays a 
valuable role in strengthening democracy by institutionalizing decentralization and 
thus preserving the autonomy of regional and local governments, and providing a 
better representation to minority groups. 
 
“Therefore federalism can hold a multi-ethnic state together, by 
reconciling nationalism and democracy in a multi-ethnic state, giving 
territorial concentrated minorities authority over matters of local 
concern, security in the use of their language, culture, and religion, 
and protection from the discretion of the sentiments of the national 
majority” (Diamond 1999:152). 
 
In highly polarized societies, parties may agree to design the geographic 
boundaries of the federal states along the geographic boundaries of ethnic 
communities. As Fleiner et al. point out, this can critically also be seen as a policy 
of ethnic separation that increases intercultural conflict potentials instead of 
reducing them. Yet, empirical evidence still needs to be provided for this critical 
assessment (Fleiner 2002:250). 
 Countries seeking to maintain the unity of the state in multiethnic and 
multinational societies choose federalism as a form of geographical pluralism. A 
federation is a way of bridging ethnic diversity by incorporating such differences 
within a wider political community.3 Kymlicka stresses the differentiation between 
federal systems that were not designed as a response to ethno-cultural pluralism, 
like the United States, Germany or Australia, and “multination” federations. In 
                                                 
2 Federalism is defined as the principle of sharing sovereignty between central and 
provincial (or state) governments. Significantly the existence and functions of the states 
(the federal units) are entrenched; they can only be modified by amending the constitution. 
It is this protected position of the states, which distinguishes federations from unitary 
governments (Hague/Harrop et al. 1998:168). 
3 Many federations emerged as voluntary associations between previously autonomous 
states, like in the United States, Switzerland, Canada, or Australia. It is also possible for 
unitary states to restructure as a federation, like e.g. Belgium which is the main example for 
this more rare occurrence, or that federal structures are chosen in the process of nation-
building what many third-world countries did after the colonial rule (Hague/Harrop et al. 
1998:168). 
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multination federations, the boundaries of one or more sub-units are designed with 
the purpose of enabling a national minority to exercise self-government, like in 
Canada, Belgium, Spain and Switzerland. There are other examples of quasi-
federal systems of devolution, like Scotland and Wales, where the sub-units have 
their own legislative assemblies but the country remained a “unitary” state 
(Kymlicka 2000:211). But in both cases - “multination federations” and quasi-
federal systems - the territorial autonomy enables national minorities to establish 
and govern their own public institutions operating in their language including 
schools, universities, courts and regional parliaments. 
 If one or more regions within a federal state are vested with special powers not 
granted to other provinces one also refers to this as “symmetrical” or “regional 
autonomy”. The federal model may be regarded as unnecessary if the need is to 
accommodate only one or two minority groups. In these situations, special powers 
may be devolved only to that part of the country where the minority constitutes a 
majority; these powers are exercised by regional institutions. Ghai stresses in 
contrast to the liberal theory based on the assumption of equality of all individuals, 
“asymmetric autonomy acknowledges the unevenness of diversities and opens up 
additional possibilities of awarding recognition to specific groups with special 
needs or capacities, such as […] a minority linguistic group” (Ghai 2000:158). 
The majority of most contemporary states are unitary states, which means that 
sovereignty lies exclusively with the central government. Sub-national authorities, 
whether regional or local, may make policy as well as implement it but they do it 
only by permission of the centre. The centre can abolish lower levels of power. 
Many democracies have decentralized power to lower levels, but stopped short of 
the reallocation of sovereignty required to create a federation. In the 1990s there 
was a great tendency to delegate responsibility for more functions (including fund-
raising) onto lower levels through democratic decentralization. Democratic 
decentralization requires by definition the transfer of control to lower levels of 
elected government – in the strongest form the devolution of real authority over 
some aspects of the policy agenda (Diamond 1999:149).4 Besides the effects of 
decision-making power and recognition for minority groups, Robert Putnam 
stresses the powerful socializing impact of decentralized participation (Diamond 
1999:122). Involvement in the democratic local government is a great educative 
force, because it teaches citizens to look beyond their immediate interests, 
recognizing the just demands of others, and if necessary, accept decisions, they did 
not initially like. Ghai on the other hand rather sees that the requirements that the 
state should be “unitary” have often retarded the acceptance or the implementation 
                                                 
4 The three common ways in which unitary states disperse power from the centre are 
deconcentration, decentralization and devolution:  
• Deconcentration is purely a matter of administrative organisation, as it refers to the 
(re)location of central government employees away from the capital.  
• Decentralization is defined as delegating policy execution to independent bodies, 
traditionally local authorities but also (increasingly) a range of other agencies.  
• Devolution is the most radical form of power dispersal, as the centre grants 
decision-making autonomy (including some legislative powers) to lower levels of 
government  
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of meaningful devolution, like e.g. in Sri Lanka (Ghai 2000:4). The degree to 
which powers are devolved to lower levels of government needs to be examined 
carefully.  
 What are the advantages and weaknesses of federal structures, especially with 
regard to potentials for conflict management in ethnically heterogeneous societies? 
Federal structures provide for checks and balances on a territorial basis, keep some 
government functions closer to the people, and allow the representation of 
difference (for example ethnic diversity). The existence of several states also 
produces healthy competition and opportunity for experiment. Federalism holds out 
the tempting prospect of reconciling difference in a larger unity. Yet as civil war in 
Yugoslavia confirmed, federalism encloses no formula for conjuring harmony out 
of ethnic conflict (Hague/Harrop et al. 1998:175). An important question is how to 
secure the rights of minorities within the federal units, as a federal restructuring of 
the state often only refers the minority question to a lower level. 
Federalism does not automatically support the consolidation of democracy, 
neither does it guarantee a state without violent secessionist movements. There are 
various examples of federal states, which struggle with internal separatist 
movements. The question is, why some federal systems in multinational societies 
have managed to safeguard peace, while in others there are violent secessionist 
movements. Hamish Telford compares in his paper the federal systems of 
Switzerland, Canada and India with special regard to their ability to guarantee 
stability. He defines stability as “the absence of secessionist movements among the 
constituent units of the federation” (Telford 2002:52). The hypothesis in Telford’s 
paper is, that “quasi-federalism can exacerbate nationalist resentment, which may 
contribute to the rise of separatist movements” (Telford 2002:53). The federal 
principle would need to be operationalized around three core dimensions: a) the 
constitution b) fiscal arrangements and c) the party system. In his comparative 
study Telford points out that only Switzerland has guaranteed an explicit federal 
principal in all three dimensions. Canada is ambiguous with regard to the federal 
principal guaranteed in the constitution, quasi-federal with regard to financial 
independence of the federal states but has managed to be federal with regard to the 
party system. India is only quasi-federal in all three dimensions, which according 
to Telford has led to a rather unstable situation.5 The major issues, which violate 
the federal principle in India are especially the supremacy of the centre, which 
provides the president with a veto power to state legislation, the “emergency 
provision”, which allows to transform the state in a unitary state in case of 
“national emergency”, insufficient financial resources of the federal states as well 
as Article 356 (President’s rule), which allows the president to dismiss a state 
government if the state has “failed”6 (Telford 2002:60). Telford concludes that the 
lack of sovereignty accorded to the states in India contributed to the rise of 
                                                 
5 India faced in the past and partly still faces violent secessionist crisis in Punjab, Kashmir, 
Assam plus moderate sentiments from Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh (Telford 2002:52). 
6 President’s rule was exercised in India very often, especially in times of decline of the 
hegemony of the Congress Party: it was exercised 8 times between 1950-1964, 67 times 
between 1965-1987, and about 30 times after 1987 (see Telford 2002: 60). 
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nationalist and separatist movements around the country. If federalism is meant to 
consolidate democracy and accommodate multiethnic claims, it needs to guarantee 
the federal principle in all dimensions (constitution, financial arrangements, party 
system) both in legislative and practical terms. If it fails to guarantee the federal 
principle, it is likely to challenge the democratic system through secessionist 
movements.  
 In her latest study Nancy Bermeo analyses the relative merits of federalism 
versus unitarism in divided societies, using the data set of Ted Gurr’s “Minorities 
at Risk” (MAR) project. Her research hypothesis is, if the diffusion of power 
intrinsic to federalism does in fact benefit territorially concentrated minorities, one 
would expect minorities in federal states to engage in fewer acts of armed 
rebellion, to experience lower levels of economic and political discrimination, and 
to harbour lower levels of grievances concerning political, economic, and cultural 
policy. Her comparative research reveals, that on all six dimensions of 
accommodation, federal regimes score better than unitary regimes (Bermeo 2002). 
 On the other hand it is often more accepted to grant autonomy to certain 
regions under the label of “decentralization” or “devolution” than under the label of 
federalism, as this might imply splitting sovereignty. The introduction of the 
provinces and the devolution of power to these units made autonomy more 
palatable to the Sinhalese community in Sri Lanka (Ghai 2000:18). Kymlicka takes 
a very strong position with regard to the fears of the majority group, that federalism 
might finally lead to separation. He stresses that the majority population in the 
country needs to accept first, that a separatist claim is legitimate, as a true 
democracy can not force nation groups (identity groups) to remain within the 
boundaries of the nation state. For him this acceptance is the necessary 
precondition to introduce a federal system, which at the end might be suitable to 
accommodate the claims of the minority groups within the new model of regional 
autonomy (Kymlicka 2000:222).  
 
A  F e d e r a l  S y s t e m  f o r  S r i  L a n k a  a s  S o l u t i o n  
t o  t h e  E t h n i c  C o n f l i c t ?  
 
Federalism is a lively discussed issue in Sri Lanka since 1926, when S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike advocated the idea of federalism as a constitutional response to Sri 
Lanka's diversity. As Wilson in his historical chapter on the uprising of Tamil 
nationalism points out, the Tamils in Sri Lanka began to support a violent separatist 
movement only in 1976, after federalization was denied (Wilson 2000:110). The 
Federal Party, which later on was transformed into the Tamil United Liberation 
Front (TULF) had fought between 1949 and 1976 for a federal solution to 
accommodate the demands of the Tamil community. In the following, some of the 
cornerstones of the debate on federalism in Sri Lanka will be summarized, which 
will provide the necessary background to understand where Sri Lanka stands today 
and what the issues are in the recent debates following the Memorandum of 
Understanding. 
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 In his political speech for the introduction of federalism in Sri Lanka S.W.R.D. 
Bandaranaike argued mainly against the centralised administrative system, which 
was introduced by the British and, according to his opinion, could not minimize the 
communal differences in the country but rather destroyed the old tradition of earlier 
existing Gram Sabhas (village councils) in Sri Lanka, which allowed the 
communities far reaching autonomy.7 Bandaranaike was in favour of a model like 
Switzerland, as size and ethnic composition showed some similarity with the Sri 
Lankan context. Bandaranaike’s proposal for federalism in Sri Lanka has to be 
seen in the light of the demands of the community of Kandyan Sinhalese who 
wanted to safeguard their powers through a model of federal states.8 But neither the 
colonial authorities nor the following indigenous governments after independence 
seriously considered a federal system as possible solution to accommodate the 
claims of different ethnic identity groups.  
 The strongest promotion of federalism as solution to the rising ethno-political 
tensions between the Sinhalese majority and the Tamil population in the North-
East came from the Federal Party in 1949. The leader of the Federal Party S.J.V. 
Chelvanayakam fought for more than two centuries for a solution to the uprising 
ethnic tensions, opting for a federal solution within a united nation. The proposals 
and demands of the Federal Party regarding a federal solution comprised four 
objectives: 
 
• Federalism or autonomy for the North-East 9 
• Equality and parity of status for Sinhala and Tamil10 
• Citizenship for all those who have made this country their permanent home 
• Stopping all state-aided colonization in the North-East, which changed the 
demographic pattern (see Wilson 2000:82) 
 
The proposal was based on the example of India, showing a cooperative model of 
federalism with a strong centre (see Warnapala 1994). The comprehensive proposal 
of the Federal Party for a federal solution in 1970 was unequivocally rejected. The 
                                                 
7 Bandaranaike spoke about the earlier Gram Sabhas as “loose federations”, which were 
bound by one common oath to the king.  
8 The Kandyan Sinhalese wanted to have three different states, one of the Kandyan 
Sinhalese, one for the low country Sinhalese and one for the Tamil Provinces.  
9 A federal union of Ceylon, comprising the two Tamil speaking Northern and Eastern 
Provinces along with the seven Sinhalese provinces. It was not even envisaged to merge the 
two Tamil-majoritarian provinces into one unit. The goal was to attain some autonomy 
through setting up regional councils with adequate centralized powers in the two Tamil 
provinces. The stress was on a loose type of federalism, suitable to achieve a reasonable 
share of governmental power for Tamil-speakers in their traditional homeland, in “respect 
of subjects which are of local importance" (Wilson 2000:90f). 
10 Regarding the language policy the Federal Party understood “parity of official status” in 
the sense that Tamil should be the language of administration and of the courts in the two 
Tamil provinces and that provision should be made for Tamil-speaking people in the seven 
Sinhala provinces to transact their daily business with government offices in a language 
they understood. Under the Indo-Lanka Accord in 1987 the J.R. Jayawardene government 
finally agreed to legislate for official recognition of both languages throughout the island, 
but the implementation still seems to be insufficient. 
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new constitution of 1972 stressed instead the unitary character of the state, which 
was even more entrenched in the 1978 constitution. Between 1972-75, just some 
years before Chelvanayakam died, the Federal Party changed its political struggle 
towards a separatist solution, stating: “There is no other alternative for the Tamils 
to live with self-respect other than fight to the end for a Tamil Nadu (Tamil State) ” 
(Wilson 2000:108).11 This change of mind was the result of 20 years experience of 
different ruling Sinhalese governments, which denied to agree to a federal solution, 
or in some cases agreeing to it but failing to implement it.12 Wilson identifies the 
nationalist and discriminating policy of the Sirimaro Bandaranaike government 
from 1970-1977, especially the introduction of the two systems of standardisation 
of marks for admission to the universities, directed specially against Tamil students 
as the catalyst for the uprising of a Tamil nationalism for separation. Wagner points 
out that the strong resistance of the Buddhist nationalist movement, which stressed 
that Sinhalese people were discriminated against in favour of the Tamils’ 
employment in the public sector, opened up the door for a policy of sinhalization 
which undermined any compromise for a federal state structure (Wagner 
1997:2031). The Sinhala nationalist policy taken up by the two leading parties, can 
be seen as the main challenge to the legitimacy of the Sri Lankan state, moving 
away from the concept of a secular state, which guaranteed equal rights and 
opportunities to all citizens independent of their religious or ethnic affiliations 
(Wagner 1997:203).  
 New dynamics came into the debate on federalism under the Indo-Lanka peace 
accord in 1987. The introduction of the Provincial Council system shows that the 
path of symmetric devolution to all regions of the country was chosen, instead of 
an asymmetric solution, granting only autonomy to the majority Tamil areas in the 
North-Eastern Province. According to Ghai the symmetric devolution of power to 
all eight provinces of the country was the more acceptable step of granting 
autonomy to certain regions than to grant more autonomy only to the Tamil held 
areas (Ghai 2000:18). 
 The Federal Party, which was later renamed as the TULF (Tamil United 
Liberation Front), redefined their claim for Eelam in a federal formula in 1989.13 
The TULF promoted a “union of states” and later a “union of regions” as political 
                                                 
11 Wilson states that the demand for a separate state was a much simpler concept than the 
earlier pleas for federalism and reached high popularity quickly (Wilson 2000). 
12 The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact of July 1957 and the Dudley Senanayake-
Chelvanayakam Pact of 1965, both agreements between the Federal Party and the ruling 
party were two opportunities to work on the implementation of federal structures – 
unfortunately both efforts were not successful and countermined by the change of 
government. An interesting insight into the fight of the Federal Party for a federal solution 
to the ethnic conflict and the reactions and counter-policies of the majority parties UNP and 
SLFP is provided by Wilson, and will not be further examined in this paper.  
13 Since 1992 there was a Tamil party consensus for a need for a federal solution, which 
was shared by Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF), Tamil Eelam Liberation 
Organisation (TELO), People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), Eelam 
People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), while the political leader of the up-
country Tamil population in the estates, A. Tondaman, rather argued against a federal 
solution. 
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solution to the conflict, terms which were incorporated in some of the devolution 
proposals formulated by the People’s Alliance (PA)-government and the opposition 
parties after 1994.  
 In this earlier debate on federalism one important aspect, which impacts still on 
today’s discussion is, that the term “federalism” has often been misinterpreted, as 
the concept was not understood or the debate was polarized by certain political 
parties. Wilson states that it is possible that Sinhalese parliament members did not 
understand the concept of federalism except in the vulgar colloquialism that it 
meant “dividing the country” (Wilson 2000:104). One reason for this 
misunderstanding is seen in the fact, that the Federal Party had discussed the idea 
of a federation between the North-East of Sri Lanka with India before they came up 
with the federal proposals concentrating only on the Sri Lankan island (Warnapala 
1994:127). This initial idea created fears and suspicion amongst the Sinhalese 
majority and was often used to argue against a federal solution by Sinhalese 
politicians. In the same direction leads the discussion rising around the name of the 
Federal Party, which in the Tamil translation was “The Ceylon Tamil State or 
Government Party”. Although the Federal Party leaders insisted that the word 
“state” denoted a unit within a federal set-up and not a sovereign state, the populist 
opinion was, that this party was trying to cover up their ultimate goal to divide the 
country through forming a separate Tamil state. Another source of 
misunderstanding of the concept of federalism is the fact that many Sri Lankan 
scholars as well as politicians believe that one first needs to have two independent 
states before Sri Lanka can become a federal state (see Edrisinha 2001:25). With 
regard to the anti-federalist tendencies the Federal Party stated: “Those who say 
that federation leads to separation are either not aware of what it means or are 
deliberately seeking to distort its true meaning for dishonest political purposes” 
(Wilson 2000:91). 
 Until short before the Memorandum of Understanding was signed, there was 
still some hesitation to use the term federalism in the debate on a political solution 
of the conflict in Sri Lanka. Before the peace talks started Prof. G.L. Peiris, one of 
the leading Ministers working on the constitutional reform, mentioned that it is 
now time to familiarize the people with the model of federalism by using the term 
from now on in the political debate. In the past politicians were rather speaking of 
devolution of power instead of federalism. Since the breakthrough in the peace 
talks in Oslo, where the LTTE for the first time publicly agreed to the option of a 
federal solution to the ethnic conflict under the condition of far-reaching autonomy 
for the North-East, the term federalism has suddenly entered the public discourse. 
There are daily articles on the concept and comparative studies on federal 
structures as well as various offers by federal countries like Canada, Germany or 
Switzerland to the conflict parties to study their systems.14 So, federalism has come 
                                                 
14 See Pravada, Vol. 8, No. 4 2002: “Federalist Option”; Daily Mirror, 11.1.2003: 
Federalism and institutions (Nancy Bermeo); Daily Mirror 9.1.03: “Search for federal 
structures” (Vasana Wickremasena); Sunday Observer, 12.1.03: “Federal solution. Towards 
greater democracy (Ajith Rupasinghe); Daily Mirror, 14.1.03: “All-party team to study 
Federalism”; Northeastern Herald 17.1.03: “Federalism in Lanka – is it the way out?”. 
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out of the shadow of a “not-to-talk-about”-issue and has become a new fashion 
word and a great hope for the future of Sri Lanka. According to Schindler, 
federalism is not a solution to an ongoing conflict, but rather a mean to prevent 
conflicts (Schindler 1993:37). After a war is terminated, the establishment of a 
federation on the basis of equal rights for the conflict parties can be successful to 
prevent the outbreak of future conflicts, as it was the case in Europe after 1945. In 
this regard, the Memorandum of Understanding between the Sri Lankan 
government and the LTTE has provided the necessary condition to allow the debate 
on federalism to be re-established and the ongoing peace talk provides the 
necessary foundation that the establishment of a future federal structure for Sri 
Lanka can be envisaged.  
 In this recent debate it is stressed, that a federal solution in Sri Lanka needs to 
give recognition to the Tamil people living predominantly in the North-East as an 
independent nation. As this acknowledgement is the most sacred demand of the 
Tamil national movement the political solution needs to recognise a historic 
homeland of the Tamil community constituting the North-East. However 
recognising a Tamil nationhood should not in any way reduce the political status of 
the Moslems and Sinhalese people living in these areas, or in the country. The 
same is true for all communities living elsewhere in the country, including the 
Tamil plantation worker (see Rupasinghe, Sunday Observer (Colombo), 12.1.03, p. 
9). A federalist option would need to safeguard equal opportunities of all 
communities in all regions of the country.  
 We will now have a closer look on the devolution debate of the past and will 
look into the implementation of decentralised and devolved structures and powers. 
As it is in the end a question of whether groups on the local level feel represented 
and recognised within the political system, it seems important to examine what has 
been achieved in this regard. Reforms towards a federal structure of the country 
should take these lessons from the local level into account.  
 
 
T H E  I M P L E M E N T A T I O N  O F  D E V O L U T I O N  
O F  P O W E R  I N  S R I  L A N K A   
 
T h e  M i l e  S t o n e s  i n  t h e  D e v o l u t i o n  P o l i c y  o f  S r i  L a n k a  
 
The first mile stone in the devolution policy in Sri Lanka was the above mentioned 
13th Amendment to the Constitution, certified on 14th November 1987 with the 
introduction of the Provincial Council System. Devolution of power was 
introduced for the first time in the post-colonial Sri Lankan Constitution. Like 
stressed by the Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA), “the scheme of devolution 
was meant to cover the entire country, but it is indisputable that the catalyst and 
main driving force behind the search for an appropriate scheme was the ethnic 
conflict and the need for a politically negotiated settlement, by addressing the 
legitimate grievances and aspirations of the minority nationalities of this country” 
(CPA 2001:18).  
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 The Indo-Lanka accord provided acknowledgement of the distinct character of 
the North-East, although the devolved powers granted to the regions were limited, 
leaving most powers with the central government. As Edrisinha has stressed, the 
13th Amendment permits the Centre both to retain so much power and also to 
undermine devolved powers so easily, that it could not lead to substantial 
devolution (Edrisinha 1998). Wagner stresses that “again the Buddhist nationalist 
opposition and the SLFP influenced the UNP to withhold important concessions to 
the Tamils like the permanent merger of the eastern and northern provinces to form 
a single Tamil linguistic unit and a devolution of power which included powers on 
land colonization policies” (Wagner 1997:204). Therefore neither the TULF nor 
the LTTE have accepted the Provincial Councils.  
 Thangarajah describes the introduction of the Provincial Council System from 
a Tamil perspective like follows: 
 
“The creation of Provincial Councils (PC) itself was a controversial 
Act, done not as a genuine act of political accommodation but an 
exercise forced by India. Opposed by some of the most powerful 
figures within the government of that time, the exercise in devolution, 
the 13th Amendment was doomed from the beginning. Opposed by the 
People’s Liberation Front (JVP) and used as a means to nearly topple 
the government, the new Prime Minister chose to de-legitimize the 
Provincial Councils. Seen as an appendage of India, the Prime 
Minister wanted the ex-militant groups who were elected to the 
Northeast Provincial Council to be humiliated and the powers 
deranged […]. Hence, the PC was a non-starter from the beginning. 
With the departure of the Indian army, the elected members left for 
India fearing annihilation  in the hands of the LTTE” (Thangarajah, 
forthcoming). 
 
The LTTE as well as the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), the radical Sinhalese 
nationalist movement, repudiated the accord, which ended in the war against the 
Indian Peacekeeping Forces. The Provincial Council of the North-East lasted only 
between 1988-1990 and was afterwards deprived of its power. The Governor, 
appointed by the President, took over the control of the North-Eastern Province. An 
achievement of the devolution policies of the past was, that the Preamble to the 
Indo-Lanka Accord acknowledged that Sri Lanka is a multi-ethnic, multi-lingual 
society. It recognized that each ethnic group has a distinct cultural and linguistic 
identity, recognized that north-eastern areas are that of “historical habitation of Sri 
Lankan Tamil people who have at all times lived together with other ethnic 
groups” (CPA 2001:20). No constitutional reform thereafter has tried to challenge 
this multi-ethnic, pluralistic social perception of Sri Lanka, which can be seen as 
achievement in the context of the history of chauvinism in the country (CPA 
2001:20).  
 On the other hand the devolution of power to regions was already too much in 
the eyes of the JVP, which mounted a violent campaign against the government. 
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The terror campaign of the JVP affected the implementation and operations of the 
new decentralisation initiative to a considerable degree (Slater 1989:77). The time 
between 1978 and 1994 is termed by some scholars as period of authoritarian rule 
during which the devolution policy was not brought much forward. After the PA-
government took over in 1994, attempts were made, to enter into a peace process 
with the LTTE through negotiating further autonomy models. During these 
following years several proposals for more far reaching devolution of power to the 
regions were designed by the ruling party and discussed in the parliament with 
opposition parties.15 
 According to Sri Lankan scholars the reform proposal from 1995, which is 
incorporated in the draft constitution produced in 1997, represents the most far 
reaching attempt to share power as a means of ethnic reconciliation. It defines the 
nature of the state as a “union of regions”. This draft constitution, in moving away 
from an entrenched unitary state, has brought about a paradigm shift in policy 
formulation towards a meaningful sharing of power between regions and 
communities. The constitutional reform proposal is based on the realization that 
one of the central problems of modern constitutionalism is to take aspects of 
recognition and cultural identity into account to contribute to reconciliation of 
ethnic conflict. In Sri Lanka it is argued that the symbolic recognition and 
acknowledgement of Tamil identity must precede negotiations on power-sharing 
arrangements (Tiruchelvam 2000:216).  
 The most recent proposal on devolution is the Draft Constitution from August 
2000. As Edrisinha has stressed it is the most accurate reflection of a broad 
consensus of the two leading political parties - the People’s Alliance (PA) and the 
United National Party (UNP) - and shows the scope and extent of devolution of 
power the two parties were willing to agree upon. However, the proposal is rather 
disappointing and even moderate Tamil parties who were willing to compromise 
and support the October 1997 draft, had difficulties in accepting it. The most 
significant negative change was the deletion of the reference to Sri Lanka as a 
“union of regions”, which the UNP found unacceptable. Another major obstacle at 
the recent stage of devolution is that there is no regional representation at the 
centre, which is one important precondition for a substantial autonomy within a 
united country (Edrisinha 2001:12). The Draft Constitution from August 2000 
reflects the status quo in the devolution debate between the two leading parties (PA 
and UNP) before the change of the government end of 2001 where the UNP (then 
called United National Front - UNF) took over and before the Memorandum of 
Understanding was signed. As the LTTE has not been involved in the drafting of 
this proposal the recent peace process will require to restart the negotiation on a 
constitutional reform with the LTTE as well as representatives of the Muslim 
community on board. In light of the fact, that it was in the past not even possible to 
find an agreement on constitutional reforms among the PA and UNP, this new 
                                                 
15 The important proposals, which need to be mentioned, are the August 1995 Proposals (or 
Legal Draft of January 1996), October 1997 Proposal and the Draft Constitution August 
2000, which is finally the first step of a consensus paper between the PA and UNP. 
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negotiation process which now incorporates the LTTE will surely be the major 
challenge of the peace process.  
 In the following, we want to look into the Local Government system, as the 
lowest level of the devolved political system. The aim is to analyse what impact the 
devolution policy in Sri Lanka had with regard to granting more autonomy to the 
local authorities. The Local Government is closest to the people and therefore is the 
authority, which needs to accommodate the demands of the different identity and 
minority groups at the local level. Therefore, the strengthening of good governance 
and recognition of minorities at local level can be seen as an important entry point 
for the resolution of ethnic tensions, which will support the national political 
process of reconciliation. Furthermore, the lessons learnt at local level can provide 
important answers to the question how to restructure the political system so that it 
is suitable to accommodate all identity groups.  
 
R e - C e n t r a l i z a t i o n  o r  M o r e  A u t o n o m y  
f o r  t h e  L o c a l  G o v e r n m e n t  S y s t e m ?  
 
From 1948 to today the Local Government system has been reformed several 
times, with a lot of ups and downs in the devolution of power to lower levels. It is 
important to stress that the reason behind the reforms of the Local Government 
system had nothing to do with considerations of conflict resolution, but were rather 
based on the desires of national politicians to gain more influence at the local level. 
Furthermore some of the reform also tried to encourage more development 
activities through local level institutions. 
 With regard to the North-East the development of the Local Government 
system was strongly affected by the struggle between the LTTE and the Sri Lankan 
government. While the Sri Lankan government tried to show the presence of the 
Sri Lankan state in the North-East through the maintenance and establishment of 
administrative (Divisional Secretariats) and democratically elected institutions 
(Local Authorities), the objective of the militants was the opposite. The latter 
therefore attempted to undermine the effectiveness of the functioning central 
administration as well as the elected local authorities. The LTTE saw the 
Pradeshiya Sabha as a structure undermining the struggle for greater devolution of 
power and furthermore through election offering the legitimization of the non-
LTTE groups. The tension between the two forces impacted considerably in the 
administrative and local government structures at the local and provincial levels 
(Thangarajah, forthcoming). 
 
F u n c t i o n  o f  t h e  L o c a l  G o v e r n m e n t  S y s t e m  
 
The Department of Local Government was established in 1946 with the aim to 
broaden the scope of Local Government services and to provide guidance and 
supervision to the local authorities. The supervisory functions vested in the 
Government Agent were transferred to the Assistant Commissioner Local 
Government as a step to ensure more autonomy of the local authority (GoSL 
                                                                                                                     CHRISTINE BIGDON 
 
15 
1999:15). In 1952, with the Local Authority Enlargement of Power Act, there was 
a transfer of powers to the local councils, which had been before vested in the 
Minister. Between 1948 and 1980 more powers were vested in the local authorities 
through introduction of various amendments and in 1977 the power to approve the 
budget was even vested in the head of the local authority.  
 A first serious decline of the devolution of more powers to the local authorities 
took place in 1981, when the Tennakoon commission recommended the 
establishment of District Development Councils (DDC). Town Councils and 
Village Councils were abolished and legislation was enacted for the transfer of 
their functions to the Development Councils. The Development Councils 
commenced their term of office in July 1981. Consequently, a high number of 
elected representatives of the Town and Village Councils, which represented 85% 
of the population, lost their political mandates. Another undesirable effect was that 
there was a double structure created on district level, where the District 
Administration and the District Development Administration under the DDC were 
both in charge for the development planning on district level (GoSL 1999:19-20).  
 To counter the decline of people’s participation in local government, which 
started with the abolition of the town and village councils, the attempt was made to 
introduce Gramodaya Mandalas (Village Development Councils) as people’s 
forums on village level. The Gramodaya Mandalas were set up from 1981 onwards, 
but however, had proved in practice that they were unable to provide the 
community service at the village level, which the government expected them to do. 
As the performance of the Development Councils was unsatisfactory, the 
Pradeshiya Sabha16 system was developed as official committee with the purpose 
to facilitate people’s participation in administration and development. The 
Pradeshiya Sabha Act was debated in detail by the Parliament before it was passed 
as Act on April 15th 1987. The two major, topics which were discussed, were 
whether the earlier Gram Sabhas (Village Councils) were more suitable and 
whether the system of voting under proportional representation is suitable on the 
local level (GoSL 1999:20). Both questions still give reason for discussion and 
reform proposals today. The Pradeshiya Sabhas were seen as rural republics, which 
will provide the training ground for young leaders to take up higher responsibility 
in the course of time. 
 
                                                 
16 Pradeshiya Sabhas (PS) can be described as elected rural regional councils, which 
represent approximately the population of one Division. The population can vary to a great 
extend, e.g. PS Ambagamuwa, which is among the biggest PS areas in Sri Lanka, has 
188.147 inhabitants while Moneragala PS has only 42575 inhabitants (Statistical Data 2001 
by the Divisional Secretariat).  
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Provincial Council and Local Government Structure in Sri Lanka 
 
 
 
 
C o m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  L o c a l  G o v e r n m e n t  
 
The proportional representation (PR) system replaced the earlier wards system 
(first past the post - fptp). Under the PR-system the entire local authority area is 
considered as one electoral area. Political parties or individual groups (independent 
lists) make nominations for elections. The advantage is seen in the higher 
representation of minorities through the proportional representation system.17 The 
Major or Chairman of the local authority is not anymore elected by the members of 
the council but nominated by the political party or groups, which gained the 
majority in the council. The local politicians are mostly linked to the national 
parties and are the direct party supporter of national parliament candidates. In 
October 1987 the Wanasinghe Committee proposed that the total governmental 
administration should be conducted at the Pradeshiya Sabha level, for which the 
                                                 
17 “The scholarly orthodoxy has long argued that some form of proportional representation 
(PR) is needed in cases of deep-rooted ethnic divisions. […] In terms of electoral systems, 
consociationalists argue that party-list PR is the best choice, as it enables all significant 
ethnic groups, including minorities, to “define themselves into ethnically based parties and 
thereby gain representation in the parliament in proportion to their numbers in the 
community as a whole” (see Reilly 2002:157). 
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Chief Executive Officer of the Pradeshiya Sabha should be designated. However, 
the government was not inclined to accept these recommendations made by this 
commission (GoSL 1999:21).  
 
S u p e r v i s i o n  
 
Under the 13th Amendment the control and supervision of the Local Government, 
which was vested under the Ministry of Local Government, became a subject under 
the Provincial Councils. The Department of Local Government at the national level 
was discontinued and the 8 Commissioners of Local Government were appointed 
under the 8 Provincial Councils. As one problematic issue it is stated, that the 
Departments of Local Government or units established under these Commissioners 
did not possess the capacity of the former Department in the exercise of 
supervision and the provision of guidance to local authorities.  
 
R e f o r m  P r o p o s a l s / N e c e s s i t i e s  
 
Slater (Slater 1989:76) stresses that the history from 1977-1989 can be 
characterized as re-centralization rather than decentralization. In the following 
years there were various attempts to strengthen the local authorities, but many of 
the shortcomings are remaining till today. Some of the major obstacles of the local 
authorities, which are always mentioned and which will be further described in the 
following empirical analysis, are: 
 
• Political violence especially during election time amongst the competing 
parties 
• Dependency and interference by the Central Government and through 
Members of Parliament (patronage, partisan politics).  
• Lack of responsiveness to local public needs due to financial constraints, lack 
of planning capacities and competition between the administrative system and 
the elected authorities.  
• Lack of peoples participation (see e.g. Slater 1989, UNESCAP 2002). 
 
Amongst various reform commissions the latest was the “Commission of Inquiry in 
Local Government Reform” in 1999, which was appointed by the President. The 
recommendations formulated by the Commission were far reaching, covering 
various aspects with regard to greater degree of local autonomy, public 
accountability, greater responsiveness to local needs, self-reliance and equity, 
aspects of people’s participation in the affairs of Local Government as well as 
promotion of ethnic harmony (GoSL 1999:353ff).  
 The extensive 400 page report dedicated only 4 pages to the aspect of people’s 
participation and 1 page to the promotion of ethnic harmony through local 
government – obviously this was not considered as the most important aspect of 
local government reform, but still got considerable attention within the new vision 
for local government and the recommendations of the report.  
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 With regard to people’s participation the establishment of several forums like 
ratepayers associations and peoples/NGO committees, as non-formal arrangements 
or as pressure groups, which bring people into the decision-making process were 
recommended by the Commission. The report states that the service the local 
authorities can render in finding a solution to the ethnic problem is considered as 
vital and could be achieved through provision of services without discrimination on 
ethnic or communal grounds. In this regard, the report recommended the following 
tasks to be fulfilled by the local authorities: Equal distribution of resources among 
all, equal attention to proposals from all sections of the community, provision of 
services in Tamil and Sinhala and literature in both languages, equal attention to 
cultural values, promotion of religious and cultural festivals, engagement in 
conflict settlement in cases of ethnic conflict and proactive engagement in the 
creation of relationships and friendships amongst communities.  
 Other major recommendations of the report were the need for a greater degree 
of autonomy, better use of local resources, greater responsiveness to local needs, 
more engagement in participatory development and a change of attitudes from 
patronage to partnerships between national and provincial levels towards the local 
level. The report also recommended the revision of the electoral system, 
eliminating the proportional representation system and going back to the earlier 
ward system (first pass the post), which, according to the authors of the report, 
would enhance the representative character and the accountability of the 
representatives to the people. The report does not consider the negative impact on 
minority group/party representation, if one would dilute the proportional 
representation system. Even though the report outlines many short-comings of the 
recent system and gives valuable recommendations with regard to various aspects, 
the question of representation and recognition of minority groups at local level did 
get too little attention. Since 1999 only few elements of the recommendations of 
the Commissions Report have been implemented by the subsequent governments, 
what means that most of the short-comings outlined by the Commission do still 
exist. The present government has recently appointed another committee to 
investigate which recommendations still should be considered for recent reform 
proposals.  
 Besides the shortcomings in the functioning of local authorities, one has to 
consider that the local authorities are not functioning in major parts of the North-
East due to the conflict situation. Since the breakdown of the Provincial Council in 
the North-East in 1990, the local government elections were rarely held in these 
areas, as they were boycotted by the LTTE. Only in few areas of the North-East the 
local government elections were held, like in Jaffna or Ampara. In these areas the 
Pradeshiya Sabhas are functioning by elected representatives. In the other areas the 
local authorities are now running by administrative staff under the responsibility of 
a Special Commissioner, which is usually the Divisional Secretary.18 
                                                 
18 According to my information, the elections in most areas of the North-East were last held 
in 1994 and the elected representatives were active until 2000. Later on, the Special 
Commissioners took over the responsibility for the local authorities.  
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 One aspect, which is of major interest for this paper, is whether the minorities 
at local level are recognized and represented by the local authorities. Fleiner 
stresses that the legitimacy of the state at the local level can only be strengthened if 
authorities are able to respond to the legitimate needs of the population. Although a 
decentralized government has some advantages in this regard, it often faces 
technical and political difficulties in the implementation (Fleiner/Kälin et al. 
2002:252). Another important question is, whether decentralized government helps 
to dilute potential conflicts by giving some political power and some control over 
economic resources to all parts of the population including minorities and thereby 
recognizing all identity groups (Fleiner/Kälin et al. 2002:252). This question will 
be examined in the following paragraphs, looking into the reality of representation 
and recognition of minorities at the local level.  
 
 
T H E  R E A L I T I E S  O F  R E C O G N I T I O N  O F  M I N O R I T I E S  A T  
T H E  L O C A L  L E V E L  -  L I M I T A T I O N S  O F  D E V O L U T I O N  
A N D  D E M O C R A C Y  I N  S R I  L A N K A   
 
In this chapter we will look into the implementation side of the decentralized 
structures of the political system in Sri Lanka, especially with regard to the policies 
and institutions at the local level and their capacities to manage diversity, to 
mitigate ethno-political tensions and to accommodate the interests of different 
identity groups. The underlying assumption of this analysis is that democracy 
provides the basis for non-violent conflict settlement, but that this requires the 
consolidation of democracy and requires political institutionalization, which means 
strong state administration, strong democratic representative institutions, a 
functioning judicial system and a vibrant civil society. Federal structures or a 
decentralized, devolved system can support this process (Diamond 1999:93).  
 
Another assumption is, that the local government system can contribute to conflict 
resolution from different angles: 
 
• Conflict Prevention: an effective, transparent, fair and inclusive local 
government system can root out the potential areas of conflict themselves, 
which lessens the burden on the conflict resolution mechanism.  
• Developing conflict resolution mechanisms: Once ethnic tensions or 
conflicts already exist the local governance system, which is closest to the 
people can develop mechanisms (forums, platforms) to address the issues, 
encouraging people’s participation and mediation committees.  
 
The guiding questions for the following analysis of selected realities at local level 
is in how far the grievances of identity groups are met by the elected local 
government institutions within the existing devolved political system. The analysis 
is based on results from a pilot project on “Local Governance and Conflict 
                                                                                                                     CHRISTINE BIGDON 
 
20 
Management”19, which was conducted in 2002 in four selected local authority areas 
in three regions of the country. The different ethnic composition and the different 
conflict settings were the major selection criteria for the three rural locations, 
which have the following characteristics: 
 
Ambagamuwa Pradeshiya Sabha in the hill-country of Sri Lanka belongs to the 
Central Provincial Council. The area is one of the major tea estate areas of the 
country. The majority of the population in this area are Tamils (approx. 76%) – 
most of them working on the tea plantations as workers, while Sinhalese in this 
region are in the minority (21%). The area was selected as sporadic violent 
outbreaks in the estate areas of Sri Lanka between ethnic groups indicate the 
conflict potential of this region. The conflict line is between the marginalized 
Indian Tamils, which are mostly employed as plantation  workers and are often 
neglected from obtaining legal documents (identity cards) as well as other services 
and the Sinhalese establishment, which consists of estate managers and land-
owners.  
 
Moneragala Pradeshiya Sabha in the South-East of the country belongs to the 
Uva-Provincial Council. The population is predominantly Sinhalese, with approx. 
72% of the overall population (50.000) being Sinhalese, while approx. 12% are 
Tamils, next to a very small number of Muslims and other groups. The area was 
selected, as the South had faced a major conflict between the left-wing Sinhala 
nationalistic Janata Vimukthi Peramuna and the Sri Lankan government. The JVP 
supporters are mainly educated Sinhalese youth from the rural areas of the 
marginalized South. The JVP insurrection, which took first place in 1971 and a 
second time between 1987-1989 nearly produced a collapse of the political system 
and caused between 40.000-60.000 victims - a similar number as in the North-East 
war. The area can therefore be described as a post-conflict area, where some of the 
features, which have attracted youth to join the JVP, are still prevalent.  
 
Kaluthavalai Pradeshiya Sabha and Kattankudy Urban Council (U.C.), 
located in Batticaloa district, both belong to the North-Eastern Provincial Council, 
which has not been elected after 1990 being under the responsibility of a Governor. 
The latter is appointed by the President. The population within Kaluthavalai PS is 
approximately 100% Tamils while Kattankudy is 100% Muslim population.20 Due 
to the conflict situation the Local Government elections did not take place after 
1994. There are no elected members, just administrative staff, working under the 
responsibility of a Special Commissioner, who is usually the Divisional Secretary 
(DS). The Local Government system in the North-East can therefore hardly be 
                                                 
19 The Local Governance and Conflict Management Pilot Project is conducted by a team of 
researchers of the Development Studies Institute, University of Colombo in collaboration 
with the South Asia Institute, Colombo branch office, University of Heidelberg and the Sri 
Lanka Institute of Local Governance, Ministry of Home Affairs, Provincial Councils and 
Local Government funded by the Berghof Foundation for Conflict Studies, Sri Lanka. The 
final report of the project is expected in March 2003.  
20 Source: Statistical Hand Book, Batticaloa District 2000. 
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compared with other Local Government authorities in the country. It is 
nevertheless interesting to investigate the realities at local level in these two local 
authorities to see whether there is any entry-point for reconciliation of the ethnic 
tensions provided by the Local Government system. 
 
The field research was conducted in all three areas, following a similar three-step 
approach: 
 
1. Pilot visit of the area where major problems and conflict issues as well as 
the most important actors of the Local Government system were identified 
through interviews with key informants. 
2. Household-Survey, conducted in 4 different villages of the local authority 
area, asking 60 people about their perceptions, opinions and experiences of 
the Local Government and other local level actors. 
3. Institutional performance analysis of the local authority (individual 
interviews with elected members and staff) as well as focus group 
discussion and elite interviews with representatives of other 
organizations/institutions (NGOs, trade unions, Divisional Secretary, 
mediation boards, police etc.) and civil society.  
 
The extensive data collected could not yet be analyzed in detail, as the project is 
still in process. In the following only some of the most interesting findings of the 
field-research in the three different regions of the country are summarized focusing 
on the following aspects: a) finances and autonomy of Local Government, b) 
responsiveness of Local Government, c) peoples participation within Local 
Government and d) representation/recognition of different identity groups. 
 
F i n a n c e s  a n d  A u t o n o m y  o f  L o c a l  G o v e r n m e n t  
 
The powers of the local authorities are often described as rather weak, why one can 
hardly speak of a devolved system. Like Wanasinghe stresses Sri Lanka has been 
characterized by an increasing trend towards centralization, even despite 
constitutional changes towards more devolution. The sub-national levels of 
governance are kept under the control and in tutelage of the center (Wanasinghe 
1999:1). The lack of autonomy of the local authorities becomes obvious when one 
looks into the financial resources. Each elected council member has a budget of 
21.000 Rs. (approx. 250 Euro) per year to be used for development activities in the 
area, which is by far not enough to improve the basic infrastructure in the area. 
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Apart from this, each local authority has three major income sources, which are:  
 
• Rates, taxes, duties and fees levied by the local authority, which provides 
65% of the finances of the Municipal Councils (MC), 45% of the Urban 
Councils (UC) and maximum 53% of Pradeshiya Sabhas.    
• Criteria based grants disbursed by the Central Government “Finance 
Commission” through the Provincial Council.  
• Decentralized Budget, which is channelled to the respective district 
through Members of Parliament (MP) (each MP can disburse within 
his/her district approx. 2,5 Mio Rs per year)  
(UNESCAP 2002:9). 
 
It is observed that the dependency of the local authorities on the government grants 
through the Provincial Councils is very high. Generally, the revenue collection is 
very low, especially in the rural areas due to inefficient management of collection. 
The latter is due to a lack in proper revenue collection procedures, lack of staff or 
due to the fact, that party supporters and other influential people often do not have 
to pay revenue as a favor by the politicians, who got elected through their support. 
Often the parties in power postpone the normal increase of rates, as they fear to get 
unpopular. Other funds, especially the Decentralized Budget is channeled via the 
Members of Parliament of the respective district, who can decide on the amount of 
money and where they want to invest in capital works at the local level. While 
deciding on priorities, they may be receptive to citizen groups, but not necessarily 
to elected representatives of local authorities. This is particularly true in case an 
opposition party controls the local authority (UNESCAP 2002:11). The latter leads 
to the fact, that only those local authorities can get a share of the Decentralized 
Budget, which have good contacts to a Member of Parliament from the same party. 
Another negative impact is created through the fact that the Members of Parliament 
are allowed to allocate capital development funds through the district budgets. The 
Members of Parliament are often interested in constructing new facilities, like e.g. 
market places, to gain popularity in the area, regardless of the preferences of the 
people or the capacities of the local authorities for maintenance. The District and 
Divisional Secretaries who are supposed to be neutral civil servants have often 
succumbed to the demands of the Members of Parliament and, in many cases, have 
built facilities knowing that the concerned local authority did not have adequate 
capacities for maintenance. It also leads to the situation, that the Divisional 
Secretariat gets involved in development work and therefore competes with the 
local authority, which, according to legal acts, should be in charge for this. Another 
aspect is that the central development funds are channeled through the Provincial 
Councils to the local authorities, which often lead to the situation that the funds are 
used for other purposes and are not reaching the local authorities leaving some 
planned development projects without funds.   
 In the areas of our survey the finances of the local authorities were so small 
that there were rarely funds for development activities. Most funds were already 
spent for the running costs of the local authority. This clearly shows that the 
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autonomy of the local authority area is not backed by the Central Government, as 
no adequate funds are provided. On the other hand, the field research revealed, that 
the local authorities are also not demanding autonomy over their local affairs, but 
rather have inherited the dependence from the Central Government or Members of 
Parliament, like the following statement of a Chairman of a Pradeshiya Sabha 
reveals:  
 
“Last year we did not have political patronage, as my party (UNP) 
belong to the opposition party of the central government. This year, 
where UNP is ruling in Colombo, we can use political patronage to 
get more funds for our Pradeshiya Sabha” (Chairman Pradeshiya 
Sabha Ambagamuwa, Interview with the author, 16.03.03) 
 
The local authorities are not self-confident with regard to their own resources, there 
is no discussion how to make use of local resources and ways and means to 
increase the revenue. With regard to natural resources Ambagamuwa PS can be 
described as rich, as the famous Adams Peak is located there, which attracts 
millions of tourists and pilgrims every year and the area belongs to the water 
catchment areas of the hydro-power plants, providing the country with electricity. 
The focus group discussion with the PS-council members on the natural resources 
of the area and ways to make use of these resources showed very clearly that the 
local representatives are not thinking in these terms. They always referred to the 
Central Government, which should provide them with more funds or to the 
Members of Parliament, which promised to provide a greater share of the 
Decentralized Budget for the area. 
 Findings from the household survey reveal that the people have a similar 
understanding. They often mention their dissatisfaction with the Pradeshiya Sabha, 
but add that it is the fault of the Central Government not to provide enough funds 
to the local authority. This even was the case in the Eastern Province, where the 
people on the one hand mentioned that the Pradeshiya Sabha is rather weak and 
ineffective, but on the other hand stated that one can not blame the institution but 
rather the Central Government for this. This shows that people tend to expect 
everything to come from the Central Government even in a war-torn area. It cannot 
be denied that the allocation of funds for the local authorities by the Central 
Government is not sufficient. But there is also a lack of self-reliance and 
confidence in own resources amongst the representatives, which might be one 
impact of the tradition of a re-centralization policy in Sri Lanka over the last 
twenty years. 
 Another indicator for the lack of autonomy and powers of the local authorities 
is the double structure of administrative and executive powers at the local level. 
Besides the Pradeshiya Sabha there is the Divisional Secretariat (DS) responsible 
for the coordination of development activities at the local level and administrative 
procedures. The DS comes directly under the Government Agent and demonstrates 
the old tradition of civil servants in Sri Lanka. The DS and its staff, which should 
support the PS through coordinating functions is often rather side-lining the local 
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authorities, as the elected politicians are perceived as being un-educated and 
corrupted by the political parties, which the following statements show:  
 
“The system of Local Government has failed. Politicians are those 
who are responsible that our system is corrupted. Even a priest would 
get corrupted when working in the Pradeshiya Sabha” (Government 
Agent Moneragala, Interview with the author, 1.06.02). 
 
“The Divisional Secretariat (DS) is an administrative institution and 
therefore not politicized. I believe the DS can better work for the 
people, as the DS is neutral and not politicized along party lines. A 
fairer distribution of resources is possible” (Divisional Secretary, 
Ginigathenna, Interview with the author, 14.08.02). 
 
The negative opinion administrators have about the elected representatives can also 
be an outcome of the dependency of the public servants from the politicians. Some 
of the information gained through the key informant interviews reveal that the 
Government Agent or Divisional Secretariat staff often has to support political 
candidates logistically or through money during election time. If they don’t do it, 
they are in danger of getting transferred after the election. It can be observed that 
after the elections and with a change of the party the administrative staff is often 
transferred or replaced. Another aspect of side-lining the Pradeshiya Sabha is the 
influence and powers of the Members of Parliament at the local level. The 
household survey and some of the interviews with key informants revealed that the 
people often contact Members of Parliament directly to get some issues solved than 
addressing it to the Pradeshiya Sabha. The Members of Parliament usually have 
more powers and finances to support groups or projects at the local level. They 
often interfere in questions of land deeds for groups, which belong to their 
clientele. This means that identity groups, which have a Member of Parliament in 
the area where they live, have an easier access to resources and decision-making 
power than groups, which are not represented by a Member of Parliament. In the 
North-East the Tamil perception is often that the Muslim community has better 
access to the resources as they have a stronger representation through Members of 
Parliament in the ruling government. However it has to be carefully examined, 
whether these perceptions reflect the actual situation. The Statistical Handbook of 
Batticaloa 2000, for example, does not reveal any advantage of the Muslim areas 
through a higher allocation of the Decentralized Budget. A similar feeling of 
discrimination with regard to access to financial resources was expressed in the 
other two regions by certain identity groups. While in Ambagamuwa PS area the 
Sinhalese minority expressed that they do not have adequate access to resources in 
this area, as they are lacking a strong representation, in Moneragala PS area the 
Tamil Estate population expressed that their project proposals are usually not 
considered by the Pradeshiya Sabha council.  
 Generally, perception counts and the only way to deal with these perceived 
discriminations of identity groups is to be more transparent in the resource 
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allocation to certain areas and to allow people to participate in the decision-making 
process of development planning at the local level. In the recent peace process 
there are first steps of establishing interim mechanisms in the North-East for the 
distribution of rehabilitation and development funds, like the “Subcommittee on 
Immediate Humanitarian Needs” (SIHRN) in Kilinochchi, which consists of 
Government officials and LTTE cadres. The new interim arrangements might now 
create new layers of semi-formal institutions, which work besides the already 
existing double structure of local level elected and administrative institutions. 
Besides the fact, that within these interim arrangements there is little space for 
people’s participation, this new layer bears the danger of increasing the existing 
difficulties of coordinated effective implementation at the local level. Another 
delicate aspect is, in how far minority groups, like the Muslim community, are 
represented in the subcommittee. It would be important that the interim 
arrangements try to integrate the existing institutions as far as possible, especially 
the democratically elected local authorities, which would bring in the people’s 
vote. However, it might not yet be the time to hold local government elections in 
the North-East.  
 
R e s p o n s i v e n e s s  o f  L o c a l  G o v e r n m e n t  
 
One interesting finding of the household survey in the three regions is that the 
people view the local authorities as an important forum to address their problems 
and grievances. Asking the people to which institutions they would go to address 
the most telling problems, the majority mentioned the Local Government in the 
first place, followed by the administrative institutions (Divisional Secretariat, 
Government Agent). Asking people in the two local authority areas in Batticaloa 
about their experiences with the recent Pradeshiya Sabha or Urban Council (under 
the Special Commissioner) and the earlier elected council, they clearly stated, that 
they preferred the elected councils. 91% stated that they would like to have the 
Local Government elections to take place as soon as possible. 60% of the 
respondents of the sample in the Batticaloa area 70% of the respondents from 
Ambagamuwa and 67% from the Moneragala sample have visited the local 
authority in the past to address certain problems. It seems that the local authorities 
are accepted as a democratic platform close to the people. Another finding is that 
the majority of the respondents felt that they have some influence in the decision-
making process at the local level (63% from Ambagamuwa, 73% from Batticaloa 
sample, 59% from Moneragala sample), maybe due to elections and the possibility 
of direct contact with the elected council members or other local level officers. The 
respondents were also asked whether they see any way to draw the attention of the 
PS to their problems. A surprisingly high number of 80% of the Ambagamuwa 
sample, 78% of the Batticaloa and 76% of the Moneragala sample think that one 
can draw the attention of the PS to the problems in the area, mainly through 
directly contacting PS-staff, through organizing interventions through Members of 
Parliament or through letters.  
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 Having these positive features in mind, it is now interesting to investigate 
whether the local authorities are responsive to the common needs of the people, 
whether they can fulfill the expectations, which people have. The respondents of 
the household survey have been asked whether they are satisfied with the 
performance of their local authority. Only 28% of the Ambagamuwa sample, and 
10% of the Batticaloa sample and 57% of the Moneragala sample have stated that 
they are satisfied. Those who have stated that they are not satisfied were asked why 
and some of the answers were “not enough services provided”, “no work has been 
done properly and problems are still existing”, “they never give any facilities”, 
“peoples expectations have not been fulfilled”. The respondents from Batticaloa 
also raised the argument, that it is due to the special conflict situation in the North-
East and the lack of Central Government support, that the local authorities can not 
function efficiently.  
 The qualitative interviews with some key informants also showed that many 
people have no confidence in the institutions. In Ambagamuwa and Moneragala, 
the Tamil Estate workers in particular mentioned that the Pradeshiya Sabha is not 
doing anything for their community.  
 
“The PS would not do anything for us. They don’t accept any 
proposals given by us. We have no voice” (Moneragala, Female Estate 
Worker, Kumarawatte, Interview with the author, 31.05.02). 
 
In Kahambana, a remote Sinhala village in Moneragala, the people expressed their 
anger with the local politicians,  
 
“[…] who (politicians) come only shortly before the election but are 
never seen again, after the election” (Moneragala,Sinhalese Farmer, 
Kahambana, Interview with the author, 1.06.02). 
 
People described that before the elections the PS would send some stones and sand 
for the construction of a road to their village, which was planned since long time, 
but after the election they come and collect the material again without 
implementing anything. 
 As a first tendency the data reveals, that, generally, the satisfaction with the 
work of the local authority is very low and that there are specific groups, which 
feel that the Local Government is not responsive at all to their demands and 
problems. It is still necessary to analyze the data in more depth, looking into the 
differences in the perceptions of the respective identity groups.   
 
P e o p l e ’ s  P a r t i c i p a t i o n  w i t h i n  L o c a l  G o v e r n m e n t   
 
According to Hettige, the aspect of strengthening people's participation in local 
governance was one of the main recommendations of the Report of the Presidential 
Commission in 1999 (Hettige 2001). Already in the preamble to the Pradeshiya 
Sabhas Act (No. 15 of 1987) it is stated that: ”[…] legislation is enacted with a 
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view to provide greater opportunities for the people to participate effectively in the 
decision making process relating to administrative and development activities at a 
local level”. Although there is provision in the local authority laws to appoint 
committees and facilitate people’s participation, this provision has not been used 
meaningfully in the past (UNESCAP 2002:14). The people’s participation within 
local government decision-making is so far not very far developed, but rather 
reduced to voting during the elections. Another provision is that people are allowed 
to observe the council meetings. In practice, this is hardly taking place, as in many 
cases the local authorities do not announce their monthly meetings to the public 
and people usually do not know their right to visit the meetings of the PS. At least, 
the councils seem to inform the media on their meetings, which would send a 
journalist to observe the proceedings. 
In the household survey people have been asked whether they had any 
opportunity to join a public forum in the last year. In Ambagamuwa only 32% 
stated yes, while 50% from Batticaloa and 35% of Moneragala stated that they had 
an opportunity. Examples for the public forums people had joined were: Samurdhi 
meetings21, NGO-organised meetings, religious committee meetings, meetings of 
Community Based Organisations (CBOs), Estate Management meetings, or 
election meetings. Only one person mentioned a meeting organized by the PS, 
when the chairman came to visit the village.  
 The problems of the area and the people are mainly identified through the PS-
council members. People would contact the PS-council member of their area to 
submit their requests to them. One critique mentioned in an elite interview is, that 
the PS has no proper planning procedure. The council members would just bring in 
the requests and proposals from the people, without ranking and prioritizing the 
respective relevance of the projects. Long-term participatory planning for 
respective areas is not done.  
 Asking representatives of civil society groups, like traders associations, trade 
unions, NGOs whether they would express their opinions to the PS and trying to 
lobby for their interest groups, a common answer was: “We are powerless, we 
can’t influence anything”. It is not at all common among these groups to send a 
representative to observe the proceedings of a Pradeshiya Sabha council meeting 
and to lobby for their interest groups through contacting politicians. Realizing this 
lack of civil society groups engagement in the local political decision-making 
process, Hettige recommended the formation of neighborhood committees, which 
send their representatives to the public committees to increase the participation of 
people in the decision-making process (Hettige 2001:31).  
 With regard to gender aspects the participation of females in the political 
process is less than that of the males or, so to say, goes very often through a male 
intermediate. In the household interviews women mentioned that they would 
contact a male senior person (village elite) or the Grama Sevaka (administrative 
village headman) if they are facing a problem. But there were some examples of 
women’s organizations at the village level, which seem to be active as well as 
                                                 
21 Samurdhi is the welfare programme of the Sri Lankan Government. 
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influential at the grass-roots level. This shows that the level of people’s 
participation in the political decision-making process is generally very low, but that 
one needs to distinguish between certain groups, as gender, ethnic identity or 
class/caste identity often plays an important role in the degree of access to political 
participation. The data of the survey might neither be detailed enough to allow a 
more precise indication about the degree of access to political participation of 
certain ethnic identity groups, nor could we consider caste differences in this pilot 
research. 
 
R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  a n d  R e c o g n i t i o n  o f  d i f f e r e n t  I d e n t i t y  G r o u p s  
 
Regarding minority protection in Sri Lanka, Rajasingham-Senanayake points out 
that in the past the Sri Lankan government has used “positive discrimination” 
programmes, which aimed to correct the socio-economic marginalization of 
immigrants and minorities to the advantage of the ethnic Sinhala-Buddhist majority 
(Pfaff-Czarnecka/Rajasingham-Senanayake et al. 1999:120). This phenomenon 
was often interpreted as a deep-rooted minority complex of the majority identity 
groups – the Sinhalese, whose fear and grievances might be partly explained as a 
result of uneven development and inequalities created under British rule. Yet, the 
Sinhalese have systematically consolidated their dominance of the political, 
cultural and economic spheres, but still their minority complex becomes obvious 
when certain political decisions are taken. The affirmative action in favor of the 
Sinhalese excluded other minorities, like the Muslims or Indian Tamils, which 
were even more disadvantaged, e.g. concerning their share in public employment. 
As Wagner stresses “it (the affirmative policy) remained strictly limited to the 
Sinhalese and served as a powerful instrument of patronage for the two major 
parties” (Wagner 1997:199). With the People’s Alliance (PA) taking over the 
government in 1994 there was for the first time a recognition that Sri Lanka has an 
ethnic problem, which demands a just political solution, while earlier governments 
(UNP, SLFP) had always claimed that there is only a “terrorist problem” in the 
country.22 
 Looking into the representation and recognition of different identity and 
minority groups in Sri Lanka it is, first of all, important to ask what a minority 
group would be in the Sri Lankan context? If one thinks in the categories of ethnic 
groups, there are areas in the country where Sinhalese are forming the minority 
population, areas where Tamils are the minority, areas were Muslims are a 
                                                 
22 Uyangoda identified three competing perspectives in the Sri Lankan debate on minority 
rights: a) minorities have no special grievances in Sri Lanka, as there are no injustices on 
the basis of ethnicity (Sinhala nationalist perspective), b) minority rights can only be 
safeguarded in separate sovereignty (LTTE, Tamil nationalist perspective), and c) minority 
rights should be granted through constitutional pluralism - creation of new institutions and 
practices for the state to accommodate minority demands for rights and recognition. 
“Efforts made in the 1980s and 1990s to reform the Sri Lankan state through constitutional 
change have repeatedly brought to focus the complexity and sheer difficulty of altering Sri 
Lanks’s political structures in an exercise of ethnic accommodation and conflict resolution” 
(Uyangoda 2001, p. 109). 
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minority and there are even smaller groups like the Burgher, the Malays etc. The 
ethnic groups are also not homogenous but are divided according to caste, religion, 
place of origin, language etc. If one speaks of the Tamil community, there is a 
distinction between “India Tamils” living in the estate sector and “Sri Lankan 
Tamils”. For example, among the Sri Lankan Tamils the caste and place of origin 
(whether a person is from Jaffna or from the North-East) plays an important role 
and there are different religious groups, like Tamil Hindus or Tamil Christians. The 
Tamil community would define itself as a majority group with regard to their 
traditional homeland in the North-East. Often, numerically small groups are still 
perceived by other groups as the majority group or privileged group. In deeply 
divided societies majority-minority politics is often constructed in terms of 
competing victim-claims (Uyangoda 2001:7). In this regard, minority groups can 
not only be defined as the numerically weaker population groups in different areas 
of the country but have to be defined in each context on the basis of the perception 
of the identity groups living in the respective regions. Some of these different 
majority-minority settings are revealed in the empirical findings of this study. 
 Regarding the guiding question whether the Local Government is representing 
and recognizing all identity groups at the local level, the findings are rather 
discouraging. In Ambagamuwas PS the major problem is, that the majority of 
Tamil Estate workers, even though they form the population majority in the area, 
do not feel represented by the Pradeshiya Sabha. Although they are voting for the 
councils, the Pradeshiya Sabha is not feeling responsible for the estate areas after 
the election, stating that the estate population comes under the responsibility of the 
estate management. As the estates are privatized, any engagement of the PS would 
need a permit by the estate management. As the Pradeshiya Sabha has anyway too 
little funds to respond to the needs in the area, it seems that they feel that the estate 
management has enough funds to provide services and assistance to the Tamil 
workers. The reality is that the estate workers have no access to the local authority 
they have elected.  
 Although the ethnic composition of the population is very different in 
Moneragala and Ambagamuwa, in both areas identity groups expressed that they 
do not feel adequately represented by the Pradeshiya Sabha. As there is no 
reservation of seats for minority groups, the minorities are either not represented at 
all or in a very small number. In Moneragala all elected council members are 
Sinhalese. In Ambagamuwa the Sinhalese are in the minority and expressed that 
they have not enough representatives and power in the Pradeshiya Sabha.23 It 
seems that one crucial question is, to which group the Chairman of the Pradeshiya 
Sabha belongs, as the chairman, who finally decides what projects are taken up, 
often dominates the decision-making process within the local authority. This shows 
clearly that the existing strong hierarchical power structure fuels the perceived 
exclusion of certain identity groups. As the chairman in Ambagamuwa was a Tamil 
businessman, the Sinhalese felt excluded. On the other hand, the Tamil plantation 
workers also felt excluded, as the Pradeshiya Sabha is generally not feeling 
                                                 
23 According to their population size the Sinhalese would get 21% of the seats in the PS, 
which would be even less (5) than they actually obtain. 
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responsible for the estate areas. In Moneragala Tamils form a small minority and 
therefore have no representation at all in the elected local authority. The problem 
which was raised, is that they feel especially excluded due to the language policy 
practiced at the local level. In the public institutions they can hardly find anyone 
who understands Tamil. At the police station they have to report in Sinhala, in the 
hospital in Moneragala there is no doctor who speaks Tamil and they can’t read 
any sign board in town. There are hardly Tamil speaking officers in the Divisional 
Secretariat or among the staff of the Pradeshiya Sabha. Regarding the language 
policy, the Ambagamuwa PS was writing all minutes in Tamil and Sinhala, as there 
were representatives of both groups. In the Pradeshiya Sabha council meetings the 
statements of the PS-members were mostly translated into the other language. The 
chairman, as well as the vice-chairman are bilingual and therefore understand all 
council members without problems. It can be said that with regard to language 
policy Ambagamuwa PS can be named as progressive, although there are still 
many obstacles, and the elected members do not always understand the discussion 
which is going on, as the translation is not provided permanently. The Pradeshiya 
Sabha in Ambagamuwa somewhat represented both linguistic groups, but 
representatives of the Tamil community still expressed that they face the problem, 
that in other public institutions Sinhala is the dominant language.  
 The survey in the two areas in Batticaloa revealed that there is a difference in 
the representation of minority groups, as the Muslim minority is living in 
homogenous enclaves, which have their own local authorities. The Tamil areas on 
the other hand are also homogenous. This shows that due to a spatial and social 
segregation both identity groups are represented in their elected local authority, but 
there is no joint platform, which could support reconciliation at the local level. The 
question is, whether this segregation of the two identity groups is rather positive or 
negative with regard to an attempt to build trust and harmony among different 
ethnic groups at the local level. Considering the feelings of exclusion, which we 
observed in heterogeneous areas like Ambagamuwa or Moneragala, one has to ask 
which model is the more accommodative one. A positive feature about a joint local 
authority is that it provides a platform of interethnic bargaining and in the best case 
reconciliation.  
 
C O N C L U S I O N S  A N D  O U T L O O K  
 
Fleiner points out, that the liberal nation state is often exclusive and not inclusive 
regarding group rights, as the ideology is based on a policy of tolerance instead of a 
politics of recognition (Fleiner/Kälin et al. 2002:230). Regarding minority rights 
and the accommodation of grievances of ethnic groups in Sri Lanka the liberal 
political elite has tried to take over the example of the political institutions of the 
liberal democratic state. Regarding the protection of the numerical minority groups, 
there was no explicit policy of “positive discrimination”. The implementation of 
liberal democratic institutions, which would have been the basis of a politics of 
tolerance for all citizens, was only partially successful. The permanent double 
structure of administrative and elected executive institutions, as well as the 
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patronage relations between the national politicians and the local representatives 
and citizens, are examples which emphasize this argument. With regard to the 
language policy the legal framework since 1987 provides that Sinhala and Tamil 
are accepted as official languages, but the implementation of bilingualism is 
lacking. There seems to be a need for a Commission for Linguistic Minorities like 
in India, which safeguards the recognition and use of both languages (Mitra 
2001:58ff). 
 The empirical research revealed that the Local Government system today is not 
yet suitable to contribute to reconciliation at the local level through 
accommodating different identity groups and mitigating conflictive issues. The 
local authorities are rarely responsive to the people due to their limited powers, 
autonomy, planning capacities and resources as well as the attitudes and limited 
skills of the elected representatives. The results of the study show, that people at 
the local level are affected to a certain extent by the ineffectiveness and non-
responsiveness of the local authorities. Nevertheless, minority groups, as they get 
no recognition within the existing hierarchical and power structures, seem to be 
even more affected by the general shortcomings and therefore feel marginalized, a 
fact that might lead to the fuelling of ethnic chauvinism as propagated by some 
national parties.  
There are some aspects of the functioning of the present system, which are 
more likely to increase existing tensions than to mitigate them, such as:  
 
• Negative interferences through MPs on local level decision-making, using 
partisan lines for the distribution of resources. The Decentralized Budget is 
used to satisfy only the supporter areas of the respective party, while 
leaving other groups and areas excluded. This undermines the autonomy of 
the local authorities to control the resource distribution and to guarantee 
that it is equally distributed among all communities. 
• Inadequate representation of all ethnic groups within the elected bodies due 
to a lack of reservation of seats for respective groups. 
• Inadequate language policy within the elected bodies as well as 
administrative institutions, which leads to the situation that in all regions 
some groups feel excluded.  
• Lack of people’s participation and civil society engagement in the affairs 
of Local Government, which leads to the situation that minority groups 
often have no voice, which would lobby for their interests at the Local 
Government level. 
 
An opportunity seems to be that the people still perceive the local authorities as 
important democratic institutions, as their elected representatives are close to the 
people. The question is, how the Local Government can be reformed to make it 
more responsive and more inclusive to all identity groups at the local level and how 
the local authority can play a more active role in promoting reconciliation and 
ethnic harmony at the local level.  
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 The empirical research in three different regions with different ethnic 
composition of the population made clear, that there is generally a need to 
recognize the needs and grievances of minorities in different regions in Sri Lanka. 
However, the definition of what a minority is, is varying from one region to the 
other. While in the East the Muslim minority needs to be accommodated, the up-
country Tamils, especially the estate workers, which form the majority in 
Ambagamuwa, are another marginalized group. Sometimes these groups even form 
a majority of the population in certain regions and still are discriminated. In other 
parts of the country there are always minority groups, whether they are Sinhalese, 
Tamils, Muslims or other ethnic groups, which feel not adequately recognized 
within the existing Local Government structures. The survey showed that there are 
different settings in the country, but one crucial question in all regions is how to 
accommodate the minority groups. This question becomes particularly relevant in 
the process of designing a federal structure for Sri Lanka as means for conflict 
resolution. Where specific groups constitute an absolute minority, like the Tamils 
in Moneragala, they seem to be completely neglected, without any representation 
or recognition of their cultural and language rights. This could be addressed 
through the introduction of positive discrimination measures, like the reservation of 
seats for certain marginalized groups. Still, this needs to be carefully considered, as 
many authors rather warn to introduce quota systems as they might rather fuel the 
division of people among ethnic lines and/or reduce quality standards.24 In areas 
with two bigger ethnic groups, both groups are represented in the elected local 
authority. But there seems to be a feeling of under-representation amongst the 
smaller group. In the perceived power status of a group an important question is, to 
which identity group the chairman of the local authority belongs. This problem 
could be addressed through a reduction of powers of the chairman of the local 
authority in favor of more powers for the council members. Our field research 
revealed that this is actually discussed at the Pradeshiya Sabha level. Another 
option would be a reservation of posts for each identity group and the obligation 
that the vice-chairman always needs to be from the other ethnic group.  
 Amongst the Tamil population there is a split between the Tamil Estate 
workers and the Tamil population living in the villages. The Estate Tamils feel 
neglected, as the local authority is not feeling responsible for their needs. In 
Batticaloa the model of ethnic segregation was dominant, as both identity groups 
have their own elected local authorities. The question is, whether this segregation 
                                                 
24 Richard Goldstone, a judge from South Africa and the head of the Goldstone 
Commission, explained (Presentation in Colombo, organized by the Center for Policy 
Alternatives and Berghof Foundation) that South Africa, although adopting an “affirmative 
action” policy, did not introduce a quota system with the new constitution in order to avoid 
Zimbabwe’s negative experience. A fixed quota system bears the danger of reducing 
standards, as the candidates for the reserved seats might not yet have the necessary 
qualifications. South Africa was instead opting for an affirmative action policy for 
especially discriminated groups with flexible quotas, whereupon the institutions can decide 
on the basis of their respective requirements. This is supported by a “Commission for the 
Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Cultural, Religious and Linguistic Communities” 
(see Schmid 2001:63). 
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of the two identity groups is rather positive or negative with regard to an attempt to 
build trust and harmony amongst Tamils and Muslims at the local level.  
Generally, the Local Government system could play a vital role in the 
strengthening of a democratic culture and thereby creating more stability in the 
country, a factor that might prevent a radicalization of certain identity groups. 
Through good governance some roots of ethnic tensions and conflict can be 
reduced and through strengthening of platforms for people’s participation 
mechanisms for conflict mitigation can be established at the local level. For the 
latter we have found encouraging examples in Ambagamuwa, where ethnic riots 
had been addressed by a people’s peace committee, which included Local 
Government representatives as well as NGO and civil society members. Increase of 
good governance at the local level would require more independence of the Local 
Government from national party politics and financial empowerment of the local 
authorities. The same is relevant for the newly established interim institutions in 
the North-East of Sri Lanka, which should work transparently, encourage people’s 
participation and should be inclusive of all identity groups to avoid the fuelling of 
new tensions. At the same time the new arrangements should avoid further dis-
empowerment of the existing democratic institutions at the local level.  
 The recently revived discussion on federal structures as means to facilitate 
conflict resolution in Sri Lanka, needs to keep the different settings within the 8 
Provinces of Sri Lanka in mind, trying to accommodate the claims of the respective 
minority groups. The question of autonomy is central to many conflicts today and 
regional autonomy can play an important, constructive role in mediating relations 
between different communities in multi-ethnic states. It can defuse conflicts. It is a 
particularly appropriate mechanism for the protection and promotion of the culture 
and values of a community. But it is not an easy device to put into operation, 
especially considering that there are often minorities within the newly created 
regional units, which again need to be recognized and accommodated. Great 
political and technical skills are required to structure the federal set-up and make it 
work. As stressed by Ghai: “[…] given the difficulties of managing multi-ethnic 
states, autonomy is a valuable option, notwithstanding its own difficulties” (Ghai 
2000:24). 
 In the recently revived debate on a federal solution to the conflict in Sri Lanka 
within the peace process there is naturally the tendency to focus mainly on the 
conflict in the North-East. Besides the model of a confederation, the idea of 
introducing asymmetric federal structures, through devolving autonomy only to the 
North-Eastern Province and not to the same extent to the other provinces is 
recently discussed. That regional autonomy could be acceptable to the LTTE has 
been a major outcome of the first round of peace talks in Thailand in September 
2002.25 As there are no similar claims for autonomy from the southern or central 
regions, asymmetric devolution of power or federalism could at the same time help 
                                                 
25 Anton Balasingham, the LTTE's chief negotiator, made the politically most significant 
statement, that the LTTE is rather committed to autonomy and autonomy based self-
determination, revising their original, maximalist claim for a separate state (see Uyangoda, 
Daily Mirror, 29.09.2002).  
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to avoid overburdening the other regions with additional responsibilities to be 
carried out by intermediary institutions within a federal structure.  
 With the encouraging signal made by the LTTE it seems to be the right time to 
discuss the potentials and obstacles as well as different models of a federal state 
structure in more depth and in a transparent way. This will require that more 
politicians, civil society activists and the people are getting involved in this 
discourse. A survey which was recently conducted by the Hitotsubashi University 
Tokyo in collaboration with the National Peace Council Colombo, revealed, that a 
huge majority of the Sri Lankan Tamils in Trincomalee favoured an equal 
devolution instead of a special devolution or asymmetric federalism for the North-
East.26 Although it is questionable whether the respondents had a clear 
understanding about the different options, this shows that there are still a lot of 
open questions and scope for discussion of different models of federalism. But it 
needs to be kept in mind that it is not only the grievances of the North-Eastern 
Tamils, which need to be addressed in the coming peace talks, but generally the 
grievances of different minority groups in all regions of the country.  
 
 
                                                 
26 “What people think? A survey of ethnic groups on the eve of peace talks.” Daily News, 
29.08.2002, p.4. 
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